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Abstract
The impacts of alternative responses to a hypothetical foot‐and‐mouth disease
(FMD) outbreak occurring in the Midwestern United States are estimated using the
Regional Economic Modelling Incorporated Policy Insight + (REMI) computable gen-
eral equilibrium model, with particular attention paid to the employment impact esti-
mates. The impact on employment and GDP is estimated using forecasts of a 10‐
year period with disease outbreak duration up to 2 years. Fifteen different vaccina-
tion protocols are compared to a disease control protocol that relies on animal
depopulation with no vaccination. Results show that over the 10‐year study period,
the strictly depopulation strategy that made no use of vaccination results in approxi-
mately 677,000 jobs lost with $47 billion GDP loss. Based on the analysis con-
ducted, losses can be reduced through protocols that utilize vaccination strategies.
Through a vaccinate‐to‐live strategy with the highest vaccination capacity and lar-
gest vaccination zone, savings can be as many as 509,000 jobs in comparison to the
strategy that relies strictly on slaughter with no use of vaccination. By including
detailed job losses by occupation, this study highlights the downstream employment
effects and shows that job losses resulting from an FMD outbreak can go far
beyond the farm sector impacts that have been reported in earlier studies. Under-
standing the impacts on employment by sector provides more actionable informa-
tion than producer and consumer surplus estimates frequently reported in economic
impact studies.
K E YWORD S
computable general equilibrium (CGE), direct impacts, economic model, foot-and-mouth disease
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) is considered a low‐mortality disease,
but the resultant drop in productivity and the highly contagious nat-
ure of the virus make it one of the most economically damaging live-
stock diseases. Although an outbreak of the disease has not
occurred in the U.S. since 1929, the turn of the millennium was
marked by a number of FMD outbreaks in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
In 1999 an outbreak occurred in Taiwan, followed in 2000 by
outbreaks in South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. An out-
break in the United Kingdom in 2001 spread, within a month, to Ire-
land, France, and the Netherlands (Knowles & Samuel, 2003). These
outbreaks highlighted the need for proactive consideration of the
possibility of an outbreak in the U.S., not just amongst veterinarians
and epidemiologists, but also among economists.
The economic concern is largely motivated by the scope of U.S.
animal agriculture, which dwarfs those of other countries that have
dealt with outbreaks. In 2014, cash receipts from U.S. livestock were
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$107.7 billion. A single state in the U.S. may have more FMD‐sus-
ceptible animals than any of the countries mentioned above. For
example, the beginning inventories of cattle in the Republic of Korea
were 3.087 million in 2006. There was twice this number, 6.25 mil-
lion head, just in Kansas (National Agricultural Statistics Service,
2016; and Ban, 2017). Thus, an FMD outbreak in the U.S. could
impose heavy losses on the economy. Providing estimates of the
potential economic impact has been a research focus of numerous
studies.
The estimates of economic impacts of FMD vary depending on
the assumptions invoked about the size of the herd, location of the
outbreak modelled, and the timing of detection. Ekboir (1999) used
an input‐output model to estimate the economic impact of a hypo-
thetical FMD outbreak in California. As a fore‐runner to many of the
papers that have followed, he used epidemiological modelling to esti-
mate disease spread based on hypothetical introduction sites and
then estimated direct impacts and modelled the induced effects. His
total economic impacts ranged from $6.7 billion to $13.5 billion,
depending on the outbreak scenario. Following suit, Elbakidze, High-
field, Ward, McCarl, and Norby (2009) evaluated an outbreak sce-
nario located in the Panhandle of Texas and found $1 billion in
economic losses. Paarlberg, Lee, and Seitzinger (2002) estimated the
potential revenue impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak in the U.S.
that was similar to the one in U.K. in 2001. Their model includes
removal of animals and an export ban. Consumer fear and removal
of infected animals could cause an estimated decrease of $14 billion
in U.S. farm income. Pendell (2007) found if the outbreak was local-
ized in one cow/calf herd, the economic impacts were an estimated
$35 million. However, if the outbreak occurred in five large feedlots,
typical of a hypothetical agriterrorist attack, the impact reached $1
billion. Lee, Park, Gordon, Moore, and Richardson (2011) also imag-
ined an outbreak characterized by agriterrorism. They used an out-
break scenario pulled from Ekboir (1999), but instead of limiting
their analysis to the California economy as Ekboir had done, they
expanded the economic analysis to the rest of the U.S., continuing
to use a regional Input‐Output model (I‐O model). Changing the
scope of the model raised the economic impact estimate to between
$23 billion and $34 billion for the U.S. Carpenter, O'Brien, Hagerman,
and McCarl (2011) simulated an FMD outbreak from a dairy with a
herd of over 2,000 cows in California and found a median economic
impact in national agriculture welfare losses of $2.3 to $69 billion, if
detection was delayed for 7–22 days.
There are a number of advances in vaccine technology that also
may shift the calculus of how to best respond to an FMD outbreak.
Vaccine technology being investigated allows the distinction
between vaccinated animals and infected animals, potentially mitigat-
ing some of the trade restrictions associated with using a vaccination
response to outbreaks. Empty capsid vaccines, DNA vaccines,
recombinant protein vaccines, and peptid vaccines are advances that
allow an alternate to the risks associated with using the currently
available inactivated virus vaccines (Smith, Bennett, Grubman, &
Bundy, 2014). Since trade‐related issues are one of the major drivers
of economic impacts from an FMD outbreak, stamping‐out
approaches have been favoured because they are assumed to allow
quicker return to the normalized trade that is possible with a “FMD‐
free without vaccination” designation. However, even without rely-
ing on advances in vaccine technology, several papers (Parent, Miller,
& Hullinger, 2011; Burrell & Mangen, 2001; Rich & Winer‐Nelson,
2007) note that if stamping‐out cannot contain the disease, emer-
gency vaccination may be justified. These papers argue that the ben-
efits of more effectively arresting the spread may justify the
increased time before a return to normalized trade. Studies evaluat-
ing the outbreaks in the Netherlands and in Japan considered emer-
gency vaccination an effective tool for limiting the outbreak size
(Pluimers, Akkerman, Van Der Wal, Dekker, & Bianchi, 2002; Muroga
et al., 2012). Alternatively, Hagerman, McCarl, Carpenter, Ward, and
O'Brien (2012) used two simulations, one in California and one in
the Texas Panhandle. For California, they found no statistically sig-
nificant difference between culling rates and duration of outbreak
resulting from the use of vaccination, unless the vaccination zone
was increased to 20 km. The economic welfare losses, which
included losses to producer and consumer surpluses, transfer pay-
ments, and net welfare effects, were higher in the scenarios that uti-
lized vaccination for the Californian outbreak. In their Texas
scenario, results showed that vaccination decreased outbreak dura-
tion by 2 days, but still found lower maximum losses under no vacci-
nation. However, despite the study's findings against the use of
vaccine, these findings are in direct opposition to other research on
the benefits of using vaccine (Schroeder, Pendell, Sanderson, &
McReynolds, 2015; Pluimers et al., 2002; Muroga et al., 2012).
Schroeder et al. (2015) considered an outbreak that occurred in
the Midwestern U.S. They move the economic discussion a step
beyond quantifying economic costs for hypothetical outbreaks and
add a level of decision support for disease response policy by com-
paring the economic impacts of different outbreak strategies. This
helps to develop the economic research to complement advance-
ments that have occurred in the FMD epidemiological and vaccine
research. They used a partial equilibrium framework and estimated
producer and consumer costs approaching $188 billion, with govern-
ment costs likely to exceed $11 billion.
Economic impact of an FMD outbreak can include GDP loss in bil-
lions of dollars, job loss, and impact on trade. In this paper, we focus
especially on the impact on employment, which is not examined in pre-
vious literature. This paper builds on the work by Schroeder et al.
(2015) and estimates the impacts of a hypothetical FMD output in
terms of job loss. Instead of a partial equilibrium model used in Schroe-
der et al. (2015), we adopt a general equilibrium model. The employ-
ment effects of the modelled FMD outbreak, and the distance they
reach beyond the farm sector, provide additional information for pol-
icy makers charged with shaping U.S. disease responses.
2 | METHODS
Using the North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM
Development Team, 2013), Schroeder et al. (2015) simulated an
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outbreak occurring in the Midwest and impacting eight states,
including Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, South Dakota, Wyoming,
northern Oklahoma, Texas Panhandle, and northern New Mexico.
The model is a herd‐based, state transition model that estimates the
spread of the hypothetical outbreak under different response proto-
cols. This paper uses the NAADSM simulation results in Schroeder et
al. (2015) as inputs in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
to estimate the annual impact on employment.
The partial equilibrium model used in the source paper allows
policy makers to consider the different vaccination options in the
context of the agricultural industry. In a CGE model, the economic
impact considered is not confined to the agricultural industries that
are directly affected by the outbreak. Economic impacts on indus-
tries that are indirectly affected, such as those providing supportive
services to agriculture, are also considered. By illustrating the impact
to downstream industries linked to the livestock sector, including
detailed job losses by occupation, policy makers can target manage-
ment policies that minimize the effects to potentially impacted
industries. Providing this measurement allows policy makers outside
the agricultural industry to evaluate the effects of different FMD
responses on both the general economy and within particular
employment sectors of the full economy.
The specific CGE model used is REMI Policy Insight + (REMI is
the company name from acronym for Regional Economic Models,
Inc.). The REMI model is more complex than input‐output models. It
links an input‐output model to a dynamic econometric model,
allowing for the estimation of time path of economic impacts from
an exogenous shock (Rickman & Schwer, 1995).
The FMD scenario and response parameters used here and in
Schroeder et al. (2015) are summarized in Table 1. The vaccination
protocols included in the underlying analysis include a no vaccination
(NOVAC) protocol and two distinct vaccination strategies, Vaccinate‐
To‐Live (V2L) and Vaccinate‐To‐Die (V2D).1 The NOVAC protocol,
referred to by USDA as “stamping‐out,” relies on animal slaughter
without the use of FMD vaccine. The goal in this approach is to
destroy all infected and susceptible animals within 24 hours of
detection. The NOVAC, or stamping‐out, strategy also includes
destroying infected carcasses and cleaning the facilities. These costs
were estimated by Schroeder et al. (2015) and included in the analy-
sis here. The second strategy, V2D, is also known as suppressive
vaccination. Under this approach, a protective buffer is established
around an outbreak location. Any potentially infected animals within
the buffer are vaccinated but will be destroyed as soon as circum-
stances allow. The third type of strategy, the V2L approach, also
establishes a buffer zone within which all susceptible animals will be
vaccinated but does not require premature slaughter. All vaccinated
animals are instead allowed to enter the food chain normally.
The other parameters used in the simulation include the vaccina-
tion capacity, trigger size, and the size of the vaccination zone. Vac-
cine capacity is based on the ability to vaccinate herds by the 22nd
and 40th days after the initial detection of the disease outbreak,
with those days serving as a measuring point of the capacity to
TABLE 1 FMD scenario and response parameters analysed
Scenario Namea
Vaccination
Strategyb
Daily Herd Vaccination
Capacityc (Day 22, Day 40)
Initial # of Herds Infected
(vaccine trigger)d
Vaccination
Zonee in km
NoVac Slaughter without use of vaccine
V2D/Feedlot/Fast/10 km V2D 1, 3 (feedlots) 10 (fast adoption) 10
V2D/Feedlot/Fast/50 km 50
V2D/Low/Fast/10 km 5, 10 (low capacity) 10 (fast adoption) 10
V2D/Low/Fast/50 km 50
V2D/Low/Slow/10 km 100 (slow adoption) 10
V2D/Low/Slow/50 km 50
V2D/High/Fast/10 km 50, 80 (high capacity) 10 (fast adoption) 10
V2D/High/Fast/50 km 50
V2L/Low/Fast/10 km V2L 5, 10 (low capacity) 10 (fast adoption) 10
V2L/Low/Fast/50 km 50
V2L/Low/Slow/10 km 100 (slow adoption) 10
V2L/Low/Slow/50 km 50
V2L/High/Fast/10 km 50, 80 (high capacity) 10 (fast adoption) 10
V2L/High/Fast/50 km 50
aScenario name: The scenarios are unchanged from Schroeder et al. (2015), but the naming convention is simplified for ease of discussion. The final sce-
nario, V2L/High/Fast/50 km, is also referred to as V2LMax, also in the interest of simplicity. This is the scenario with the highest level of vaccination
capacity. bVaccination Strategy. The three broad categories are no vaccination, or stamping‐out, or “Vaccinate‐to‐Live” or “Vaccinate‐to‐Die.” cDaily
Herd Vaccination Capacity. In Schroeder et al. (2015), vaccination capacity was described using the number of herds that could be vaccinated at the
22nd and 40th days of an outbreak. The numbers shown in the top line of each cell are directly from the Schroeder et al. (2015) parameters, here they
are simplified to either feedlot, low or high capacity. dInitial Number of Herds Infected. This refers to the amount of spread prior to adopting vaccination
as part of response. Schroeder et al. (2015) modelled this as either 10 herds infected (fast adoption) or 100 herds infected (slow adoption). eVaccination
Zone. The diameter, in kilometres, of the vaccination zone around infected animals.
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administer vaccine. Schroeder et al. (2015) set the 22nd day capacity
at five herds (low capacity), 50 herds (high capacity), or one large
feedlot (feedlot scenario). On the 40th day, this was set at 10 herds
(low capacity), 80 herds (high capacity), or three large feedlots (feed-
lot scenario). The main difference between the low and high capacity
depends on whether or not producers will be allowed to administer
vaccinations, which increases the capacity to vaccinate. If USDA per-
sonnel are required to administer or supervise vaccinations, it
reduces the vaccination capacity.2 The vaccination trigger describes
the initial number of herds infected before the vaccination strategy
is implemented. This was set at either 10 or 100 herds. The vaccina-
tion zone is the size of the buffer to vaccinate herds around the
infected herds and was set at either 10 or 50 km (Schroeder et al.,
2015).
For example, the first line in Table 1 indicates a scenario where
no vaccination was used. The second line in the table describes a
scenario where the outbreak occurred in a feedlot and animals were
vaccinated to die. It indicates that vaccination stores and the vacci-
nation protocols were assumed to be sufficient to vaccinate one
feedlot by day 22 of the outbreak and five feedlots by day 40 of
the outbreak. In this scenario, there were 10 herds infected before
FMD vaccination began and all susceptible farm animals within a 10‐
km zone were targeted for vaccination.
Data used in this study include the number of animals culled,
vaccinated, and the duration of the total epidemic sourced from
Schroeder et al. (2015), which are entered as exogenous shocks in a
CGE model. The CGE model is set to forecast a period of 10 years
postoutbreak. The period simulated is from 2014 through 2024. A
baseline scenario was created by forecasting normal economic
growth for the period of 2014–2024 without any exogenous shocks.
All of the scenarios analysed are compared against this baseline sce-
nario. For example, the job losses and economic impacts estimated
from the NOVAC scenario are calculated as the difference between
the forecast results from the NOVAC scenario and the baseline sce-
nario that did not include exogenous shocks from a hypothetical
FMD outbreak.
In all modelling decisions, choices were made to assure that the
results presented here are lower bound estimates for the economic
impact. The amount of livestock industry output estimated by
Schroeder et al. (2015) as affected by the hypothetical FMD out-
break was entered as shocks in the corresponding sectors of REMI,
which are based on the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem (NAICS), with some consolidation of categories. Impacts in beef
cattle were entered in the beef cattle ranching and farming in REMI,
dairy costs were entered in dairy cattle and milk production in REMI,
and sheep and swine impacts from Schroeder et al. (2015) were
entered in the animal production, except cattle, poultry, and eggs cate-
gory of REMI.3 The detailed values entered for each sector under
each vaccination scenario are given in Table B.1 in Appendix S1.4
While disease outbreak durations modelled in the source study are
quarterly based, the CGE model used only allows for estimates on
an annual basis. In splitting the impact between years, 80% of the
impact is assumed to occur within the first and 20% in the second
year if the duration lasts more than 1 year.5 For robustness check,
the model was also evaluated with an alternative scenario where
only 60% of the outbreak occurred in the first year and the remain-
ing 40% in the second year. These results are included in the
Appendix S3. A 5% drop in beef output in the third year is assumed
to occur due to prolonged effects. For durations shorter than a year,
all losses are assumed to occur in the first year with a 5% drop in
beef demand in the second year.
One assumption of the approach is static herd populations. Zhao,
Wahl, and Marsh (2006) compared a model that assumed a static
beef population with one that considers a “stamping‐out” approach
on the U.S. beef cattle inventories. They found total welfare losses
under the static assumption were lower than the depopulation
approach. This suggests that the results obtained under static herd
population are likely to be lower bound estimates.
Total government spending related to the outbreak is reported in
Schroeder et al. (2015). Here, it was assumed that the governmental
response would come either from budgeted emergency funds or
from a reallocation of funds away from other ongoing programmes
and would not constitute any government borrowing or increased
taxation. In the CGE model, it is important to note that if mitigation
expenses come from other borrowing or taxation, and thus reduced
consumer consumption, the resulted economic impact can be sub-
stantially higher than the estimates shown here. The multiplier for
government spending is higher, relative to private sector spending.
This assumption is consistent with the intention of providing a con-
servative estimate.
Government mitigation expenses were entered into REMI as a
direct impact on affected sectors within the model, not as an
increase in government spending. The government costs include five
categories: euthanasia was entered as vet services, vaccination was
entered as vet services, disposal costs were entered in the waste
management category, cleaning and disinfecting expenditures were
entered as services to building and dwellings, and indemnity payments
were entered as compensation to agriculture. Since only total govern-
ment costs are reported in Schroeder et al. (2015), these had to be
disaggregated to determine the cost for each category. The govern-
ment cost for each category per head of species and the total num-
ber of depopulated or vaccinated animals are reported in Schroeder
et al. (2015). Therefore, the cost for each category of government
cost can be calculated as:
Costi ¼ ∑kPik  Qk
Here, Costi is the total government cost of category i, where i =
euthanasia, vaccination, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, and
indemnity; Pik is the cost of category i for species k, and Qk is the
number of species k that are depopulated or vaccinated. More
detailed information on the animal impacts used as inputs into the
CGE model is provided in Appendix S2. Table B.2 in Appendix S2
shows the cost for each category per head of species. Table B.3 in
Appendix S2 shows the number of animals depopulated or vacci-
nated. The resulting government cost by category is reported in
Table B.4 in Appendix S2, columns (1)–(6).6
MILLER ET AL. | 159
Lastly, changes in consumer surplus estimated by Schroeder et al.
(2015) are treated as changes in purchasing power for consumers.7
There are no sectors that directly correspond to consumer surplus in
REMI, but assuming linear demand, the changes in consumer surplus are
entered in REMI as the oppositive changes in consumer prices for the
Food and nonalcoholic beverages purchased for off-premises consumption
category. While this is not a perfect equivalence, the change in prices
will effectively capture the change in consumer purchasing power.
There are a few caveats that are important to note methodologi-
cally in any comparisons between this paper and Schroeder et al.
(2015). The source study estimated a quarterly model, while an
annual model is used here. For example, outbreak scenarios lasting
for two or three quarters in the model used by Schroeder et al.
(2015) were both modelled as a 1 year duration in the annual CGE
model used here. Since the impact of 1 year of government spend-
ing on an outbreak is more stimulative than one quarter of govern-
ment spending, this may cause some upward distortion of results,
especially for outbreaks lasting only one quarter. Because of this,
one quarter duration results are not included in this analysis.
Schroeder et al. (2015) modelled the 10th, 50th, and 90th per-
centiles of outbreaks from the NAADSM output in order to present
confidence bands on the economic impacts. In the interest of pre-
senting conservative results, only disease duration at the 50th per-
centile was used in the study here.
3 | RESULTS
Results are reported in Table 2. While we report the impact on
GDP, our focus is on employment impact. Over the 10‐year study
period, an FMD outbreak response that relies on animal depopula-
tion without the use of vaccine results in approximately 677,000
jobs loss with a $47 billion GDP loss to the U.S. economy.8 Losses
are reduced through various types of vaccination strategies. The
V2D strategies reduce the job loss by 128,000–477,000 compared
to the NOVAC scenario. If the vaccination strategy is changed to
allow animals to continue through normal production channels, then
the losses are further reduced. The V2L strategies save 169,000–
509,000 jobs. In every comparable scenario, the V2L strategy results
in greater savings than a V2D strategy. In terms of GDP, V2D and
V2L can reduce the loss by $9–$35 billion.
As expected, the savings in job loss increase with greater vacci-
nation capacities and larger vaccination zones. The maximum vacci-
nation capacity modelled was the vaccination protocol where 50
herds could be treated by day 22, a vaccination zone of 50 km, and
the vaccination response began quickly with only 10 herds infected.
Under the naming convention, this is V2L/High/Fast/50 km, or V2D/
High/Fast/50 km respectively. For simplicity of discussion, this is also
called V2Lmax or V2Dmax because it is the scenario that assumed
the highest level of vaccine capacity. With both the V2Lmax and the
V2Dmax strategies, job losses are reduced by 509,000 for V2Lmax
strategy and 477,000 for V2Dmax strategy. Under V2Lmax, the total
employment loss is 168,000. In comparison to the NOVAC strategy,
the V2Lmax strategy can save 509,000 jobs.
Table 3 shows the estimated job losses for the ten industries
with the greatest impact. The sum shows the impact of all jobs,
including the industries with minimal impacts not included in the top
ten listed industries. Regardless of the vaccination strategies, the top
ten impacted industries are the same, with minor differences in rank-
ing. In all scenarios, Sales, Construction, and Transportation are the
TABLE 2 Vaccination strategies and impacts on GDP and employment over 10‐year study period
Vaccination strategy
GDP loss
(in billions)
Employment loss
(in thousands)
GDP Savings vs no
vaccination (in billions)
Employment Savings vs
No Vaccination (in thousands)
NoVac $47 677 ‐ ‐
V2D/Feedlot/Fast/10 km $35 505 $12 172
V2D/Feedlot/Fast/50 km $26 377 $21 300
V2D/Low/Fast/10 km $38 543 $9 134
V2D/Low/Fast/50 km $19 282 $28 395
V2D/Low/Slow/10 km $38 549 $9 128
V2D/Low/Slow/50 km $19 279 $28 398
V2D/High/Fast/10 km $33 463 $14 214
V2D/High/Fast/50 km $28 200 $19 477
V2L/Low/Fast/10 km $35 502 $12 175
V2L/Low/Fast/50 km $17 244 $30 433
V2L/Low/Slow/10 km $35 508 $12 169
V2L/Low/Slow/50 km $17 247 $30 430
V2L/High/Fast/10 km $30 425 $17 252
V2L/High/Fast/50 km $12 168 $35 509
This assumes a total disease outbreak duration of 2 years. GDP and employment losses are estimated in comparison to a baseline scenario in which no
vaccination was used. The strategies with maximum vaccination capacity are shaded.
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top three industries that are impacted by the FMD outbreak in terms
of job loss. The granularity of the results can be most helpful as pol-
icy makers can see how impacts are distributed among various occu-
pations and industries.
Results of the robustness check using the scenario with 60% of
outbreak impacts in the first year and 40% of outbreak impacts
occurring in the second year further confirm the general findings dis-
cussed above, as shown in Appendix S3. For example, the NOVAC
strategy results in the highest number of job loss while savings in
job loss increase as vaccination capacities and zones increase. Specif-
ically, V2L/High/Fast/50 km, and V2D/High/Fast/50 km are still the
strategies that result in the highest savings in job loss among the
vaccinate‐to‐live and vaccinate‐to‐die scenarios. Also, the rank of
industries impacted by the outbreak is virtually the same as in the
80% and 20% split situation. Sales, Construction, and Transportation
are still the top three impacted industries.
Further examination of the impact on employment is shown in
Figure 1, which shows a comparison of the two extreme vaccination
protocols: NOVAC and V2Lmax, response strategies with the most
and least economic impact, respectively on the top eight impacted
occupations. The occupation category most heavily impacted is
“Sales and related, office and administrative support”. In the first
year of our simulation, a NOVAC strategy would cost 266,000 jobs
in that occupation, relative to the control scenario of no FMD out-
break, while V2Lmax would cost 84,000 jobs relative to the control.
Figure 2 shows the remaining occupations impacted under the
NOVAC and V2Lmax strategies. The rankings of the impacted
occupational categories are not the same between the two scenarios.
Clearly, different strategies affect various industries differently. In
particular, farming, fishing, forestry occupation (which includes the live-
stock industry in the REMI CGE model) is the 9th impacted category
under NOVAC while under V2Lmax, it is within the bottom five.
4 | DISCUSSION
This paper adds to the current literature that characterizes the
potential economic impact of a potential FMD outbreak. It does so
by providing employment impact with detailed effects by industry. In
addition, the paper provides a further argument for increasing the
capacity for vaccination‐based responses. Such results offer
researchers an opportunity to move policy discussions into poten-
tially unexplored directions.
One interesting finding is that the job losses are concentrated in
the Sales and related office and administrative support occupations.
Also, job losses in the farming, fishing, and forestry occupations do
not even make the top five of impacted industries. Actually, under
V2Lmax, this industry is within the bottom five. With a V2L strategy,
uninfected but vaccinated animals are still going through the normal
production process, thus the farm sector impacts are lower. Under a
strict culling strategy, all animals within a certain area are depopu-
lated with much more significant impacts to agricultural industry jobs.
In fact, the job losses in the Sales category are ten times higher than
the number of jobs lost in the farm sector for many of the response
F IGURE 1 Detailed 2014 Occupational Impacts (job losses in thousands) from FMD simulation. The black (top) bars indicate the lost jobs
resulting from a NOVAC, or stamping‐out approach. The grey bars (bottom) describe the estimated job losses resulting from the V2Lmax
strategy, or vaccinate‐to‐live approach with sufficient capacity to vaccinate 50 herds by day 22, 80 herds by day 40 of the outbreak, a trigger
of 10 infected herds and a vaccination buffer zone of 50 km
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strategy scenarios. Clearly, the threat of a large Midwestern regional
outbreak of FMD would be felt far beyond the farm gate.
Regardless of the rankings, it should be noted that various occu-
pations will be impacted by the outbreak, whether or not they are
directly or indirectly related to the agricultural industry. The detail
that a CGE model provides allows policy researchers to drill down
and expose such differences. With that knowledge, policies could
then be crafted according to the differential impacts.
The source paper did not include simulations to allow comparison
between high vaccination capacity and slow response time. However,
to provide a more direct comparison, Table 4 shows the job loss for
scenarios with vaccinations zone held to 10 and 50 km. When the vac-
cination zone is held to 10 km, approximately 6 thousand jobs were
saved from the fast adoption of vaccination; regardless of whether
vaccinate‐to‐live or vaccinate‐to‐die strategies were used. Part of the
benefit in jobs might have been attributable to the quick response
time. However, when the vaccination zone is increased to 50 km, the
job losses actually increase with a fast adoption of vaccine under vac-
cinate‐to‐die but decrease by the same amount under vaccinate‐to‐live
protocol. In terms of minimizing employment impacts, the most impor-
tant variable appears to be the vaccination zone. Job losses are
reduced by half with a 50 km vaccination zone compared to the same
protocol with a 10 km vaccination zone.
While it appears that the difference between vaccinate‐to‐live or
vaccinate‐to‐die is important, care should be taken in interpreting
these results. A vaccinate‐to‐live protocol saves between 32,000 and
41,000 jobs. However, the effect of different vaccination protocol
on exports is not included in this model. The main concern about a
vaccinate‐to‐live protocol is the increased time until FMD‐free trade
status is obtained. While changes in vaccine technology may mitigate
some of the export impacts of vaccination, with current technologies
and trade agreements, the domestic job savings under vaccinate‐to‐
live could easily be offset or reversed when export implications of
vaccinate‐to‐live are included in modelling.
Results obtained based on the different vaccination responses are
of considerable significance and highlight a number of important policy
implications. Beyond the question of whether to vaccinate or not is a
host of other important policy decisions. These include: what distance
is the appropriate vaccination zone; what level of vaccine capacity
should be maintained; should producers be allowed to administer FMD
vaccination; and what steps should be taken to minimize the detection
time. An FMD outbreak could be expected to have caused 677,000 job
losses if mitigation measures did not make use of emergency vaccina-
tion protocols and were limited to movement control, biosecurity, and
animal depopulation. In contrast, various vaccination strategies can be
adopted to lower the losses. The V2Lmax results in the most savings in
job loss, as shown in Figure 1. Overall, the results support prior findings
F IGURE 2 Other Impacted Occupations in 2014. Job losses in thousands. The black (top) bars indicate the lost jobs resulting from a
NOVAC, or stamping‐out approach. The grey bars (bottom) describe the estimated job losses resulting from the V2Lmax strategy
TABLE 4 Total Job Losses under 10 and 50 km vaccination zone
scenarios
V2D/Low V2L/Low Difference
At 10 km vaccine zone
Slow Response −549,000 −508,000 41,000
Fast Response −543,000 −502,000 41,000
Difference 6,000 6,000
At 50 km vaccine zone
Slow Response −279,000 −247,000 32,000
Fast Response −282,000 −244,000 38,000
Difference −3,000 3,000
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that increased capacity for vaccination reduces the economic impacts.
The results here add to the existing body of research that supports an
FMD response that includes vaccination. Homeland Security Presiden-
tial Directive 9 orders that a National Veterinary Stockpile (NSV) should
be created to contain sufficient amounts of animal vaccine to respond
to the most damaging animal diseases (Homeland Security Presidential
Directive No. 9, 2004). The findings related to the size of the vaccina-
tion zone support, at a minimum, a critical evaluation of the size of the
vaccine stockpile relative to the size of a potential outbreak in the U.S.
This is especially critical considering the possibility of an outbreak in an
area of high livestock concentration.
The findings also support further research into the likely
response and detection times. This is reinforcement of the results
from Carpenter et al. (2011), which stresses that early detection is
critically important. An interesting research question would be to
evaluate how different disease responses – NOVAC versus Vacci-
nate‐to‐Live – might affect livestock producer attitudes towards self‐
reporting of disease, thus potentially affecting detection rates.
One advantage of a CGE model lies in the detail of the results
provided to policy makers. The impacts resulting from the mitigation
shock are diffused more broadly throughout the economy. This pro-
vides more actionable information for policy makers interested in
the economic impacts beyond the farm gate, given the hypothesized
rate of spread, vaccination capacity, and the number of herds
infected before detection.
The partial equilibrium approach used by the source study from
Schroeder et al. (2015) and the CGE model used here are fundamen-
tally different approaches to estimate the potential economic impact
of an FMD outbreak. Different models can be used for different
research objectives. The CGE approach is more dynamic with greater
sectoral and output detail represented within the model. In the
Schroeder et al. (2015) partial equilibrium model, the reduction in
consumer surplus does not have any economic substitution; this is
captured in the CGE model used here. In the partial equilibrium
model, the government spending on carcass removal and facilities
disinfection is treated only as a cost. Here, the multiplier that results
from that spending is captured and offsets some of the economic
loss. This results in different estimates of total economic impact
which should not be compared against each other; but should be
taken as two complimentary estimates using different methodology
to better understand the potential economic impacts of FMD.
5 | CONCLUSION
This paper estimates the impact on employment from an FMD out-
break simulated in Schroeder et al. (2015) using a general equilibrium
model. In addition to reporting the economic losses, we focus on the
impact of the outbreak on job losses and further disaggregate the
losses by industry.
We find that responses that rely solely on animal depopulation
result in approximately 677,000 jobs loss with $47 billion GDP loss.
Losses are reduced through various types of vaccination strategies
and as expected, the savings in job loss increase with greater vacci-
nation capacities and larger vaccination zones. In particular, vaccina-
tion strategies with the highest level of vaccine capacity, either
vaccinate‐to‐live or vaccinate‐to‐die, result in the most savings in
GDP and job losses. Among all industries that can be affected by
the outbreak, Sales incur the highest job loss, following by construc-
tion and transportation under all vaccination scenarios.
Our results add to the discussion on FMD disease and vaccina-
tion strategies. While there have been ample studies on the eco-
nomic impact of FMD, our contribution lies in the impact of FMD
on job losses in industries. Such study can provide policy makers
another perspective when considering FMD vaccination strategies.
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ENDNOTES
1 More information on how these strategies will be implemented in the
event of an outbreak is available in the Foot‐And‐Mouth Disease
Response Plan, The Red Book, prepared by the USDA (2014)
2 FMD vaccines are restricted and controlled vaccines, and animal health
officials do not generally support the idea of producer administration
3 In REMI, the appropriate section for sheep and swine is in the ‘animal
production, except cattle, poultry, and eggs’ category
4 Values in the tables are taken from Schroeder et al. (2015) with modifi-
cations to fit a CGE annual model
5 According to Gibbens et al. (2001) (Table 2), among the FMD cases
that occurred in the first 5 months in the 2011 Great Britain outbreak,
84% of them occurred within the first 3 months. Although the paper
was written before the end of the outbreak, of the 1,849 confirmed
cases at the time of writing, 7% occurred in the fourth month, 6% in
the fifth month. For the simulation results used here that lasted longer
than 1 year, it was assumed that the outbreak would follow a similar
rate of progression as what was observed in the 2001 Great Britain
outbreak reported by Gibbens et al. (2001). For simplicity, we assumed
that 80% of the outbreak would occur in the first year and the remain-
ing 20% in the second year.
6 Since the inputs into this model are sourced from Schroeder et al. (2015),
readers are encouraged to reference the source paper as well. Table B.1
in Appendix S2 in this paper is derived from Schroeder et al. (2015).
Table B.2 in Appendix S2 is a reproduction of Table 2 in Schroeder et al.
(2015); Table B.3 in Appendix S2 shows the depopulation and vaccina-
tion numbers from the median values from the table in Appendix S1 of
Schroeder et al. (2015), and Table B.4 in Appendix S2 here is similarly
taken from information in Table 4 of Schroeder et al. (2015).
7 Again, the estimates were sourced from Schroeder et al. (2015), see
Table 4, all estimates taken from 50th percentile disease duration.
8 Our estimated economic impact of $47 billion GDP loss is substantially
lower than the estimates in Schroeder et al. (2015), which reports an eco-
nomic loss of $199 billion. In the Schroeder et al. partial equilibrium model,
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the reduction in consumer surplus does not have any economic substitu-
tion. In our CGE model, the reduced price of beef or pork is allowed to
result in consumer spending in other areas. Additionally, the government
spending on carcass removal and facilities disinfection is treated only as a
cost in Schroeder et al. (2015). The multiplier that results from that spend-
ing is captured, which offsets some of the economic loss.
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